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Abstract 
Graphical models based on conditional indepen­
dence support concise encodings of the subjec­
tive belief of a single agent. A natural ques­
tion is whether the consensus belief of a group of 
agents can be represented with equal parsimony. 
We prove, under relatively mild assumptions, 
that even if everyone agrees on a common graph 
topology, no method of combining beliefs can 
maintain that structure. Even weaker conditions 
rule out local aggregation within conditional 
probability tables. On a more positive note, we 
show that if probabilities are combined with the 
logarithmic opinion pool (LogOP), then com­
monly held Markov independencies are main­
tained. This suggests a straightforward proce­
dure for constructing a consensus Markov net­
work. We describe an algorithm for computing 
the LogOP with time complexity comparable to 
that of exact Bayesian inference. 
1 Introduction 
Suppose that you are charged with the task of modeling 
the effect of interest rates on the inflation rate. For sim­
plicity, assume. that there are only two relevant binary un­
certain events: interest rates rise and inflation rates rise. 
A full joint probability distribution describing this situa­
tion would assign a probability to each of the four possi­
ble combinations of outcomes. As the number of modeled 
events increases, the size of the joint distribution grows ex­
ponentially. Yet often, the probabilistic relationships can 
be specified more naturally and compactly in terms of lo­
cal probabilistic dependencies among events. Graphical 
models offer a language for describing a joint distribution 
in terms of events and the conditional dependence between 
them [Jensen, 1996, P earl, 1988, Whittaker, 1990]. Expert 
systems based on such models are among the most success­
ful and practical products to emerge from artificial intelli-
gence (AI) research. One of their key features is the abil­
ity to efficiently encode an otherwise unmanageably large 
joint distribution. Indeed, if sufficient conditional indepen­
dencies (Cis) exist, then memory requirements are expo­
nentially reduced. 
From an AI perspective, a graphical model typically en­
codes the subjective belief of a single agent. We address 
the more general task of compactly representing the con­
sensus or combined belief of a group of agents. 
For a modeler, decisions about how to combine beliefs are 
almost unavoidable. For example, in pursuit of an accurate 
distribution over interest and inflation rates, you may wish 
to consult several economists. In a larger model, each ex­
pert might be a specialist in some subset of the complete 
domain. When several related models already exist, it may 
be desirable to conglomerate their knowledge into a single, 
more general representation. Even when consulting only 
one expert to construct only one model, the designer's be­
liefs inevitably play a role- for example, he or she may 
choose to correct for typical biases of those unfamiliar with 
probability theory-in fact, choosing not to correct for bias 
itself may distort the expert's true beliefs. 
Can the success of graphical models within the single-agent 
framework be extended to this multiagent setting? More 
specifically, given each of the agents' beliefs, and some 
reasonable aggregation rule, will the combined belief have 
enough structure to warrant a graphical representation? 
Decades of research have yielded a variety of pre­
scriptions for aggregating beliefs, which we survey 
briefly in Section 2. We distinguish between two 
prevailing methodologies. The first, which enjoys 
a rich history within statistics and the decision sci­
ences, defines aggregation over joint distributions 
[Dalkey, 1975, Genest and Zidek, 1986, Wagner, 1984, 
Madansky, 1964]. The second, more recent and more 
popular within the AI community, focuses on combining 
graphical models [Matzkevich and Abramson, 1992, 
Ng and Abramson, 1994, Xiang, 1996]. 
This paper demonstrates that common assumptions regard-
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ing the aggregation of joint distributions imply severe lim­
itations for combining graphical topologies. Most propos­
als for combining graphical models assume that, at a min­
imum, if all agents' beliefs conform to a particular struc­
ture, then the consensus model should mirror that struc­
ture. Yet, as we see in Section 3, almost all proposed sta­
tistical aggregation methods violate this property. In fact, 
we prove that no combination function can preserve unani­
mous structures while simultaneously satisfying other nat­
ural and desirable properties. We also demonstrate that 
essentially no combination function can operate within 
each conditional probability table separately, and also de­
pend only on the underlying joint distributions. In Sec­
tion 4, we show that, although it cannot maintain arbitrary 
structures, a weighted geometric average aggregation rule, 
called the LogOP, does maintain all unanimously agreed­
upon Markov structures. We then describe procedures for 
generating consensus structures that are consistent with the 
LogOP. Section 5 presents an algorithm for computing the 
LogOP that, if the consensus structure is sufficiently sparse, 
can run exponentially faster than a brute force approach. 
2 Background: Belief and Consensus Belief 
Section 2.1 describes background and related work on sub­
jective probability and belief aggregation. In Section 2.2, 
we cover relevant material on two graphical models for 
representing probability distributions-Bayesian networks 
(BNs) and Markov networks (MNs)-and discuss their ap­
plicability for encoding both individual and multiagent be­
lief. 
2.1 Opinion pools and aggregation properties 
Suppose that n agents are uncertain about m binary events, 
A1, Az, . . .  , Am, and thus do not know which of the 2m 
possible joint outcomes or atomic states will eventually ob-. I { tam. Let Z = A1, Az, ... , Am} be the set of events, and 
Jet (2 = {wl, Wz, ... , Wzm} be the Set Of all 2m (exclusive, 
exhaustive) atomic states. We refer to the Aj as the primary 
events, to distinguish them from the other 22m - m possi­
ble sets of atomic states, each of which is also an event. 
A joint probability distribution Pr associates a probability 
with each atomic state. 
A designer of a probabilistic expert system must assign, 
implicitly or explicitly, all 2m probabilities. In many 
situations-for example, when the modeled events encom­
pass a domain broader than any one expert's specialty­
more than one source is consulted for probabilities. There 
is a large body of work in the statistics literature which ad­
dresses the aggregation of experts' beliefs into a single, co­
herent representation. 
1 An example of an atomic state is A1 A A2 A A3 1\ · · · 1\ Am 
or, written more simply, A,A2A3 ... Am. 
If each of the n experts, including the system designer, 
holds a subjective belief Pr;, then a consensus joint proba­
bility distribution Pro is any function f of the Pr;: 
(I) 
where Pro is itself a legal joint probability distribution. 
The combination function f is often called an opinion 
pool. Many pooling functions over many years have been 
proposed; Genest and Zidek [1986] provide an excellent 
overview of the various kinds and discuss their relative 
merits. The two most common and well-studied are the 
linear and logarithmic opinion pools (LinOP, LogOP). The 
LinOP is a weighted arithmetic mean of the members' 
probabilities for atomic events, 
N 
Pro(Wj) = L a;Pr;(wj ), 
i=l 
and the LogOP is a weighted geometric mean, 
(2) 
(3) 
where the a;, called expert weights, are nonnegative num­
bers that sum to one. A third pooling method iden­
tifies one distinguished individual h (real or fictitious, 
within or outside the group) as a so-called supra Bayesian 
[Lindley, 1985]. The consensus is then defined as the supra 
Bayesian's posterior distribution, given the "evidence" pro­
vided by all of the experts' opinions: 
Pra(w/Prt, ... , PrN) ex: Prh(Pr1, ... , PrN/w)Prh(w). 
(4) 
Because this approach takes a single agent's perspective, it 
is well grounded in normative Bayesian theory. Implement­
ing it requires that we choose the supra Bayesian, or assess 
its prior belief if it is fictitious [Genest and Zidek, 1986]. 
Computing the posterior further requires that the supra 
Bayesian specify a joint distribution over all other agents' 
beliefs. 
Attempts to justify more symmetric opinion pools 
often proceed by posing axioms on the combi­
nation function, and arguing that they represent 
desirable properties [Dalkey, 1975, Genest, 1984c, 
Genest, 1984b, Genest, 1984a, Genest and Zidek, 1986, 
Genest et al. , 1986, Genest and Wagner, 1987, 
Wagner, 1984]. Researchers have proved that certain 
pooling formulae are implied by certain sets of prop­
erties. We begin with two seemingly incontrovertible 
assumptions. 
Property 1 (Unanimity (UNAM)) !fPrh(w) = Pr;(w) 
for all agents h and i, and for all states w E 0, then 
Pro(w) = Pr1(w). 
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Property 2 (Nondictatorship (ND)) There is no single 
agent i such that Pro(w) = Pr;(w) for all w E 0, and 
regardless of the agents' beliefs. 
UNAM states that if everyone's assessments are in com­
plete agreement, then the consensus agrees as well. ND 
simply ensures that what is inherently a multiagent prob­
lem is not reduced to the single-agent case. 
Property 3 (Marginalization property (MP)) Let E be 
an arbitrary event, that is, any subset ofO. Then, 
f(Prt, Pr2, ... , Prn)(E) = 
f(Prt(E) , Pr2(E), ... , Prn(E)). 
Property 4 (Externally Bayesian (EB)) Let E and F be 
arbitrary events. Then, 
f(Prt, Pr2, ... , Prn)(EIF) = 
f(PrtiF, Pr2IF, ... , Prn IF)( E). 
MP and EB require consistency for probabilistic oper­
ations performed before and after pooling. MP states 
that we obtain the same probability for an event E 
whether we pool the opinions first, and then compute 
Pro(E) = LwEE Pro(w ), or if we first compute Pr;(E) = 
LwEE Pr;(w) for each agent i, and then pool their opin­
ions only over E. Similarly, EB holds that we obtain the 
same Pr0(EIF) whether we combine opinions first and 
condition on F second, or condition on F first and com­
bine opinions second. It has been shown that any f satisfy­
ing both MP and UNAM is a LinOP [Genest, 1984c], and 
any satisfying EB and UNAM is a LogOP [Genest, 1984a]. 
Genest [1984b] also shows that f cannot simultaneously 
satisfy MP, EB, UNAM, and ND. 
Property 5 (Proportional dependence on states (PDS)) 
Pro(w) <X f(Prt(w) , Pr2(w), ... , Prn(w)). 
PDS is sometimes called independence of irrelevant states, 
or termed a likelihood principle. It assures that the con­
sensus likelihood ratio between two states does not depend 
on the agents' assessments of any other "irrelevant" state. 
The LinOP, LogOP, and most other proposed opinion pools 
satisfy PDS. 
Property 6 (Independence 
erty (IPP)) Let E and 
If Pr;(EIF) Pr;(E) 
Pro(EIF) = Pro(E). 
preservation 
F be arbitrary 
for all agents i, 
prop­
events. 
then 
IPP requires that all unanimously held independencies are 
preserved in the consensus. Advocates of IPP reason that 
identifying the independencies in a model is central to un­
derstanding the underlying phenomena, and that complete 
agreement on this dimension should be embraced. On the 
other hand, Genest and Wagner [ 1987] make a compelling 
case against the use of IPP by proving that no aggregation 
function whatsoever can satisfy it along with PDS and ND, 
when 1111 2: 5. 
One might argue that IPP is overly strong. It requires 
preservation of, for example, a unanimous independence 
between the events E = A3:ih and F = A2A4 V A7. This 
kind of independence seems of little descriptive value to a 
modeler, and indeed cannot be represented with a BN. The 
designer may be willing to forgo preserving all indepen­
dencies, being content to preserve independencies among 
the primary events, A1, A2, .. , Am. With this in mind, 
we define a weaker independence property. 
Property 7 (Event independence preservation property 
(EIPP)) If Pr;(A1 IAk) = Pr;(Aj) for all agents i, then 
Pro(Aj IAk) = Pro(Aj ). 
In Section 3, we see that substituting EIPP for IPP does ad­
mits a possibility that is consistent with both PDS and ND, 
though not a very satisfactory one. In search of a nontrivial 
possibility, we define two even weaker independence con­
ditions. 
Property 8 (Markov event independence preservation 
property (MEIPP)) IfPr;(AJIWAk) = Pr;(AJIW)for 
all agents i and for all W <;; Z (including W = 0 ), then 
Pro(Aj IAk) = Pro(Aj)· 
Property 9 (Non-Markov event independence preser­
vation property (NMEIPP)) If Pr;(Aj IAk) = Pr;(Aj) 
for all agents i, and Prh(Aj IW Ak) f Prh(Aj IW), for 
some agent h and some W <;; Z, then Pro(Aj IAk) = 
Pro(Aj ). 
These two properties are purposely constructed so that 
EIPP ¢} (MEIPP 1\ NMEIPP). We see in Section 3 that 
the source of the impossibility lies entirely within the lat­
ter. Finally, we define a stronger version of the MEIPP. 
Property 10 (Markov independence preservation prop­
erty (MIPP)) Let W, X <;; Z- Aj be disjoint sets of events 
such thatA1UWUX = Z. IfPr;(AJIWX) = Pr;(AJIW) 
for a// agents i, then Pr0(A1 IW X) = Pro(Aj IW). 
The relative strengths of these various independence con­
ditions can be summarized as follows: 
IPP =? EIPP ¢} (MEIPP 1\ NMEIPP) 
MIPP =? MEIPP 
2.2 Graphical models for belief and consensus belief 
The Bayesian network (BN) has proved invaluable as a 
language for compactly encoding a joint probability distri­
bution [Jensen, 1996]. Conciseness is achieved by factor­
ing atomic states into primary events, and exploiting con­
ditional independence among these events. Consider the 
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event Ak E Z, with events A,, A2, . . .  , Ak-l preceding it 
in index order. Suppose that, given the outcomes of a subset 
pa(Ak) S::: {A1, A2, ... , Ak-d of its preceding events­
called Ak 's parents-the event Ak is conditionally inde­
pendent of all other preceding events. This structure can be 
depicted graphically as a directed acyclic graph: each event 
is a node in the graph, and there is a directed edge from 
node Aj to node Ak if and only if Aj is a parent of Ak. We 
also refer to Ak as the child of Aj, and Ak U pa( Ak) as the 
family of Ak. We can write the joint probability distribution 
in a (usually) more compact form: 
m 
Pr(A1A2 ··· Am) = IT Pr(Ak!pa(Ak)). 
k=l 
For each event A., we record a conditional probability ta­
ble (CPT), which contains probabilities Pr(Ak lpa(Ak)) 
for all possible combinations of outcomes of events in 
pa(Ak)· Thus it is possible to implicitly represent the full 
joint with 0(2qm) probabilities, instead of 0(2m), where 
q is the maximum number of parents of any node in the 
network. 
A Markov network (MN) is another graphical lan­
guage for modeling conditional independence and for im­
plicitly describing a joint distribution [Whittaker, 1990, 
Darroch et al., 1980]. Events are again associated with 
nodes in a graph, and edges encode probabilistic dependen­
cies. However, as opposed to BNs, the underlying structure 
of a MN is an undirected graph. Given the outcomes of 
its direct neighbors, an event Aj is conditionally indepen­
dent of every other event in the network, not just preceding 
events. The neighbors of an event form a Markov blanket 
around it, "shielding" it from direct influence from the rest 
of the events [Pearl, 1988]. We call the node Aj and the set 
of nodes X S::: Z - Aj Markov independent, given another 
set W S::: Z- X - Aj, if Pr(Aj !W X) = Pr(Aj !W) and 
Aj U W U X = Z. Thus a node is Markov independent of 
all other nodes, given its blanket. Encoding the joint dis­
tribution implied by a MN involves assigning a potential 
probability to each clique [Neapolitan, 1990, Pearl, 1988]. 
The Markov blanket of a node in a BN consists of its direct 
parents, its direct children, and its children's direct parents 
[Pearl, 1988]. Therefore a BN can be converted into a MN 
by moralizing the network, or fully connecting ("marry­
ing") each node's parents, and dropping edge directionality 
[Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988, Neapolitan, 1990]. 
A MN can be converted into a BN by filling 
in or triangulating [Kloks, 1994] the graph, and 
adding directionality according to the fill-in order­
ing [Jensen, 1996, Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988, 
Neapolitan, 1990, Pearl, 1988]. Both transformations 
are sound with respect to independence, but neither 
is complete. A filled-in BN is also called decompos­
able [Chyu, 1991, Darroch et al., 1980, Pearl, 1988, 
Shachter et al. , 1991]. 
Although most BN research concerns modeling a sin­
gle agent's belief, some researchers have examined the 
use of BNs in a multiagent context. Ng and Abram­
son [ 1994] describe an architecture called the probabilis­
tic multi-knowledge-base system, which consists of a col­
lection of BNs, each encoding the knowledge of a single 
expert. The authors choose to keep the BNs separate and 
combine probabilities at run time with a variable-weight 
variant of the LinOP. They address a variety of engineer­
ing issues, including the elicitation and propagation of ex­
pert confidence information, and build a working proto­
type to diagnose pathologies of the lymph system. Xiang 
[ 1996] describes conditions under which multiply sectioned 
Bayesian networks, originally developed for single agent 
reasoning, can represent the combined beliefs of multiple 
agents. The main assumption is that, whenever two agents' 
BNs contain some of the same events, they must agree on 
the joint distribution over these common events. Bondu­
elle [ 1987] prescribes both normative and behavioral tech­
niques for a decision maker (DM) to identify and reconcile 
differences of opinion among experts. When those opin­
ions are expressed as graphical models, he suggests that the 
DM first choose a consensus topology, and then calculate 
aggregate probabilities. Jacobs [ 1995] compares the LinOP 
and supra Bayesian approaches as methods for combining 
the multiple feature analyzers found in real and artificial 
neural systems. 
Matzkevich and Abramson [ 1992] give an algorithm for ex­
plicitly combining two BN DAGs into a single DAG, or 
fusing the two topologies. The algorithm transfers one arc 
at a time from the second DAG to the first, possibly re­
versing the arc in order to remain consistent with the cur­
rent partial ordering. Reversing arcs may add new arcs 
to the second DAG [Shachter, 1988], which would in turn 
need to be transferred. In a second paper, the same au­
thors show [ 1993] that the task of minimizing the number 
of arcs in their combined DAG is NP-hard, as are several 
other related tasks. They argue that, intuitively, the consen­
sus model should capture independencies agreed upon by 
at least c S: n of the agents; in particular, when c = n and 
the orderings are mutually consistent, the consensus DAG 
should be a union of the individual DAGs. In both of these 
papers, and in Bonduelle's work, it is essentially assumed 
that the EIPP, or a stronger version thereof, should hold. 
Though Matzkevich and Abramson make no commitment 
on how to combine probabilities, they do give an example 
[1992] where the LinOP is applied locally, or separately 
within each CPT. We say that such a localized aggregator 
satisfies the family aggregation (FA) property. 
Property 11 (Family aggregation (FA)) 
Pro(Aj lpa(Aj )) = 
f(Pr,(Ai lpa(Ai )), ...  , Prn(Aj lpa(Aj ))). 
--; 
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, At I llo\ A2) 
... , 
1A3) 
Figure I: Independence preservation behavior of (a) LinOP 
and (b)-(d)LogOP. If two agents' beliefs Pr1 and Pr2 have 
the dependency structures shown, then the consensus Pro 
will in general have the dependency structure depicted in 
column three. 
Although FA may seem natural, we see in Section 3 that it 
conflicts with other compelling properties. 
3 Combining Bayesian Networks: Examples 
and Impossibility 
In Sections 3.1 and 3.2 we consider the implications of the 
properties EIPP and FA, respectively. 
3.1 Event Independence Preservation 
Example 1 (EIPP and the LinOP) 
Suppose that two agents agree that two primary events, 
A1 and A2, are independent, as pictured in Figure l(a), 
but disagree on the associated marginal probabilities. For 
concreteness, let the first agent hold beliefs Pr1(Al) = 
Pr1(A2) = 0.5, and the second Pr2(Al) = 0.8 and 
Prz(Az) = 0.6. Thus, 
Pr1(A1A2) = 0.25 
Pr1(A1A2) = 0.25 
Pr1(A1A2) = 0.25 
Pr1(A1Az) = 0.25 
Pr2(A1A2) = 0.48 
Pr2(A1A2) = 0.32 
Pr2(A1A2) = 0.12 
Pr2(A1Az) = 0.08. 
Now if we apply the LinOP (2) with, say, equal weights of 
w1 = w2 = 0.5, we get: 
Pro(A1A2) = 0.365 
Pro(A!Az) = 0.41 
Pro(A1A2) = 0.185 
Pro(AlAz) = 0.165. 
In particular, Pro(Al) Pro(Az) f. Pro(A1A2). and so the 
two events are not independent in the consensus.2 Even 
though the precondition of the EIPP is met, the postcondi­
tion is not: a BN representation of the derived consensus 
would have to include an edge between A1 and A2. o 
Example 2 (EIPP and the LogOP) 
Suppose that two agents' beliefs over two primary events 
are as described in Example I. If we apply the LogOP with 
equal weights, we get: 
Pro(AlAz) = 0.367007 
Pro(A1A2) = 0.29966 
Pro(A1A2) = 0.183503 
Pro(A1A2) = 0.14983. 
In this case, Pro(A1) Pr0(A2) = Pro(A1Az), and the 
two events remain independent, as shown in Figure I (b). 
This is not a numerical coincidence; in fact, indepen­
dence between only two events is always maintained by 
the LogOP [Genest and Wagner, 1987]. Now suppose that 
among three primary events, both agents agree that As is 
independent of Az given A1. That is, both agents agree 
that dependencies conform to a tree structure, with A1 the 
parent of both A2 and As. as depicted in Figure l(c). Then 
once again, the LogOP will maintain this structure. One 
might conjecture that the LogOP maintains all BN struc­
tures, but this is not the case. For example, suppose that, 
among three primary events, the two agents agree that A1 
and Az are mutually independent, and that A3 depends on 
both A1 and Az. That is, both agents agree on the polytree 
structure in Figure !(d). In this case, when we compute the 
consensus with the LogOP, A1 and Az will in general be­
come mutually dependent, the EIPP is not satisfied, and a 
consensus BN will require an arc between the two nodes. 
0 
Having seen that both the LinOP and the LogOP violate 
the EIPP, we seek a more general characterization of the 
class of functions that do obey it. We begin by showing 
that Lemma 3.2 in [Genest and Wagner, 1987], originally 
proved with respect to the IPP, is also applicable under the 
weaker EIPP. 
Lemma 1 (Adapted from [Genest and Wagner, 1987]) 
If f obeys EIPP and PDS, then there exist constants 
a1, az, . . . , an, and c such that 
n 
Pro(wj) = L a;Pr;(wj) +c. 
i=l 
(5) 
2 As early as Yule [1903] it was recognized that averaging two 
distributions may mask a commonly held independence. 
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Proof (sketch). Consider three events At. A2. and A3, 
with agents' beliefs described as follows: 
Pr;(AtA2A3) = Pr;(AtA2A3) 
Pr;(AtA2A3) 
Pr;(AtA2A3) 
(1- z;)2 
4(1+z;) 
1- z; 
4 
X; 
(6) 
where z; = x; + y; for all i. I n  this case, all agents agree 
that At and A2 are independent and, as long as z; < 1, 
these equations describe a legal probability distribution. 
Since f obeys PDS, there must be some function g such 
that, 
and similarly for Pro(AtA2�). Now imagine a second 
situation exactly as in (6), except with Pr;(AtA2A3) =xi 
and Pr;(AtA2A3) = Yi· Genest and Wagner show that, as 
long as x; + y; =xi + Yi < 1, then 
g(Xt, X2, · · · , Xn) + g(yt, Y2, · · ·, Yn) 
== g(x�, x� , ... , x� ) + g(y�, y�, ... , y�). (7) 
From here, they show that since x; andy; can be chosen 
arbitrarily (as long as their sum is less than one), then f 
must have the form specified. 0 
Genest and Wagner go on to show, without further assump­
tion, that f must be a dictatorship. However, that proof 
does not carry through under the weaker condition EIPP. 
This can be seen via a simple counterexample. Let f al­
ways ignore the agents' opinions, and simply assign a uni­
form distribution over all w E fl. I n  this case, the consensus 
distribution holds that all primary events Aj are indepen­
dent, and thus any agreed upon independencies are trivially 
maintained. One might wonder whether EIPP admits any 
other, more appealing, aggregation functions. The follow­
ing proposition essentially establishes that it does not. 
Proposition 1 No aggregation function f can simultane­
ously satisfy EJPP, PDS, UNAM, and ND. 
Proof. With the addition of UNAM, it is clear that c 
must be zero in (5), and thus f must have the form of 
a standard LinOP (2). From Example I, we know that 
the LinOP does not maintain independence even between 
just two events. The fact that the LinOP cannot satisfy 
both IPP and ND is proved formally by several authors 
[Genest, 1984c, Lehrer and Wagner, 1983, Wagner, 1984]. 
Their proofs are applicable to EIPP as well, since they hold 
even when 1111 = 4, in which case EIPP and IPP coincide. 
0 
A careful examination of the proof of Lemma I also sug­
gests one more possibility when the full generality of IPP is 
relaxed. Suppose that all agents agree that all three events, 
At. A2, and A3, are completely independent. Then it can 
be shown that Pr;(AtA2A3) = z;/(1 + z; ) + y; and, fur­
thermore, that x; = y; for all i. I n  this case, (7) holds 
only vacuously, since xi = x; and Yi = y;. Moreover, 
since x; and y; are no longer arbitrary, the proof does not 
go through. Thus, under this fully independent condition, 
the conclusion of Lemma I is no longer valid. 
This insight leads us to characterize the inherent impossi­
bility more sharply, by dividing EIPP into two, weaker con­
ditions, NMEIPP and MEIPP, and showing that the former 
retains the impossibility while the latter does not. 
Corollary 1 No aggregation function f can simultane­
ously satisfy NME/PP, PDS, UNAM, and ND. 
Proof. The proof of Lemma I still follows under NMEIPP, 
and thus so does the proof of Proposition I. 0 
Section 4 demonstrates that in fact, MEIPP is perfectly con­
sistent with PDS, UNAM, and ND in a nontrivial way. In­
deed, the stronger MIPP is consistent as well. 
3.2 Family Aggregation 
Example 3 (Family aggregation) 
Consider two agents, each with a BN consisting of two pri­
mary events, with At the parent of A2 and with beliefs as 
follows: 
Prt (At) = 0.2 
Prt(A21At) = 0.4 
Prt(A21At) = 0.6 
P r2(At) = 0.8 
P rz(A2IAt) = 0.8 
Pr2(A2IAt) = 0.3 
We compute each consensus CPT as an average of the cor­
responding individual CPTs. That is, Pr0(At) = (.2 + 
.8)/2 = .5, Pr0(A21At) = (.4 + .8)/2 = .6, etc. This 
results in the following consensus joint distribution: 
Pro(AtA2) = 0.3 
Pro(AtA2) = 0.2 
Pro(A1A2) = 0.225 
Pro(AtA2) = 0.275. 
Next suppose that both agents reverse their edge between 
the two events, such that A2 is the parent of A1, but that 
their joint distributions remain unchanged. Now the agents' 
CPTs are: 
Prt(A2) = 0.56 
Pr1(A1IA2) = 0.142857 
Prl(A1IA2) = 0.272727 
Pr2(A2) = 0.7 
Pr2(AtiA2) = 0.914286 
Pr2(A1IA2) = 0.533333 
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and if we average locally within each CPT, we get a differ­
ent consensus distribution: 
Pro(AtA2) = 0.333 
Pro(AtA2) = 0.149121 
Pro(At A2) = 0.297 
Pro(AtA2) = 0.220878. 
Thus averaging only within each family of the BN violates 
the form of the opinion pool itself (I), which insists that the 
consensus joint distribution depend only on the underlying 
joint distributions of the agents involved. D 
We now show that this inconsistency is not confined solely 
to the averaging aggregator. 
Proposition 2 No aggregation function f can simultane­
ously satisfy FA, UNAM, and ND. 
Proof (sketch). Let the first event in the consensus BN be 
Aj, the second Ah, ... , and the last Aj m. The FA property 
requires both of the following: 
Pro(Aj,) 
f(Prt (Aj, ), Pr2(Aj,), ... , Prn (Ail)) (8) 
Pro(Ajm\Z- Ajm) 
f(Prt (Aim \Z- Aim), . .. , Prn(Aim \Z- Aim tV.l 
By the definition of an opinion pool (I), the consensus 
belief depends only on the agents' underlying joint dis­
tributions, and not on the particular ordering of events in 
each BN. Thus, we must arrive at the same consensus dis­
tribution as long as {it, h, . .. , im} is some permutation 
of {1, 2, . . . , m}. Consider two permutations, one where 
}t = 1 and one where im = 1. Then (8) and (9) become: 
Pro(At) 
= f(Prt(At), Pr2(A1), ... , Prn(At)) (10) 
Pro(A1\Z- A1) 
f(Prl(At\Z- A1 ), ... , Prn(AJ\Z- A!))(! I)  
Dalkey [1975] proves that no function can simultaneously 
satisfy (I 0), (II), UNAM, and ND. Alternatively, the two 
equations essentially require that f satisfy both MP and 
EB, which Genest [ 1984b] shows are incompatible with 
UNAM and ND. D 
4 The LogOP and Consensus Markov 
Networks 
The results in Section 3 suggest that insisting upon general 
event independence preservation has rather severe conse­
quences. In this section, we see that preserving Markov in­
dependencies is in fact compatible with PDS, UNAM, and 
ND. Let Aj be a primary event, and W � Z - A1 and 
X = Z - W - Aj be sets of events. Then Aj is Markov 
independent of X given W ifPr(Aj\WX) = Pr(Aj\W). 
Proposition 3 The LogOP satisfies MIPP. 
Proof. Since the LogOP is defined in terms of atomic states 
w, we make use of the following two identities: 
p (A\WX) _ Pr0(AWX) ro = Pr0(AWX)+Pro(AWX) 
_ LxPro(AWX) Pro(A\W) = 
Lx Pro(AW X)+ Lx Pro(AW X) 
where Lx represents a sum over all possible combinations 
of outcomes of events in the set X. Then we have that, 
Pro (A I W X) = """'r-:::.....,-"�":::----;=m-::::-=:-::::-:-
IT 
= -"---IT�[-P •-, (�A-W�)�P .�; l( WlXl)�]�"'�"��rr��p1, �(A�W� )�P�,1�(W� X-)l<•�, 
L....t x P r1(w) + � X P r1(W) 
_ Lxfl[Pr,(AWX)]"• 
- Lx WPr,(AW X)]•• + Lx II[Pr,(AW X)]•• Pro(AWX) 
= Lx Pr0(AW X)+ x Pr0(AW X) 
= Pro(A\W) 
D 
Suppose that each agent's belief is given as a MN, and we 
wish to generate a consensus MN structure that can en­
code the results of the LogOP. As discussed in Section 2.2, 
graph connectivity in a MN represents probabilistic depen­
dence, and the neighborhood relation represents direct in­
fluence. For each node Aj, the set of its neighbors plays 
the role of W in Proposition 3, and all other nodes consti­
tute the set X. The proposition ensures that, if all agents 
agree on a common MN structure, then the consensus dis­
tribution derived by the LogOP will respect the same struc­
ture. When agents are not in complete agreement on the 
structure, then the consensus can be represented as a MN 
defined by the union of all the individual MNs. In other 
words, there is an edge between Aj and Ak in the consen­
sus MN if and only if there is an edge between those two 
nodes in at least one of the agents' MNs. 
Pearl [1988] gives axiomatic descriptions of both MNs and 
BNs. Only the former includes an axiom called strong 
union, which states that if Pr(Aj \Ak) = Pr(Aj ), then 
Pr(Aj\WAk) = Pr(A1\W) for all W � Z. Notice that, if 
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the precondition of the EIPP is met, and strong union holds 
for all agents, then the precondition of the MEIPP must also 
hold. This axiom is the key distinction that allows common 
MN structures to be maintained in the LogOP consensus, 
whereas common BN structures in general are not. 
Given a collection of BNs, generating a consensus BN 
structure that is consistent with the LogOP is also rel­
atively straightforward. We first convert each BN into 
a MN by moralizing the graphs, or fully connect­
ing each node's parents and dropping edge directional­
ity [Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988, Neapolitan, 1990]. 
Next, we compute the union of the individual MNs, 
and finally we convert the resulting consensus MN 
back into a BN by filling in or triangulating the net­
work, reintroducing directionality according to the fill­
in order3 [Jensen, 1996, Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988, 
Neapolitan, 1990, P earl, 1988]. 
We have outlined how to derive consensus MN or BN 
structures; what of computing the associated probabilities? 
In Section 5, we give an algorithm for computing the prob­
abilities in a consensus BN that is polynomial in the size 
of its CPTs. Note that, even when all agents agree on a 
BN structure, the size of the final representation may grow 
exponentially during fill-in, and computing the union of 
the intermediate MNs when agents disagree will only ex­
acerbate this problem. Nevertheless, even a decomposable 
representation can be exponentially smaller than the full 
joint distribution, and the most popular algorithms for ex­
act Bayesian inference do operate on decomposable models 
in practice. 
5 Computing LogOP and LinOP 
Since the LinOP (2) and LogOP (3) are defined over atomic 
states, computing, for example, the consensus marginal 
probability of a single event involves in the worst case a 
summation over 2m -I terms. Moreover, even computing 
the LogOP consensus for a single state requires a normal­
ization factor that is itself a sum over all 2m states. I n  this 
section, we see that if each agent's belief is represented as a 
BN, the LinOP and LogOP consensus for any probabilistic 
query can be computed more efficiently. In particular, for 
the LogOP, we can compute the CPTs of a consensus BN 
with time complexity 0( nm22q), where q is the maximum 
number of parents of any node in the consensus structure. 
We focus first on the task of generating a LogOP-consistent 
consensus BN. We compute its structure as described 
in Section 4. Consider computing the CPT at Aj, that 
is, Pro(AJ lpa(AJ )) for all combinations of outcomes of 
3We do not claim that these consensus structures are correct 
or minimal in any sense, or even that LogOP is the preferred ag­
gregation method. Our goal is more to guide a modeler's decision 
process by delineating what representations are consistent under 
what circumstances. 
Figure 2: Two potential sections of a decomposable BN. 
Aj 's children can be either in the same clique or in separate 
cliques. 
events in pa(AJ ). From P roposition 2, we know that sim­
ply combining each agent's assessment of this conditional 
probability will not succeed in general. However, we can 
compute the last CPT, Pr0(Am lpa(Am)), in terms of only 
the Pr;(Am lpa(Am)), by computing the LogOP over the 
single event Am: 
Pro(Amlpa(Am)) = 
[1;'::.1 [Pr;(Am lpa(Am))]"' 
f1 [Pr;(Am lpa(Am))]"• + f1 [Pr;(Am lpa(Am))J"'. 
(12) 
Because the LogOP satisfies EB, if we condition on all 
other events Z - Am in the network, then the LogOP 
over just Am will return the same result as if we had 
computed the LogOP over all events, and then con­
ditioned on Z - Am. Equation 12 also reflects the 
fact that Pro(Amlpa(Am)) = Pro(AmiZ- Am) and 
Pr;(Amlpa(Am)) = Pr;(AmiZ- Am). by the semantics 
of the BNs. 
We can compute the remainder of the CPTs in reverse in­
dex order. Assume that the CPTs Pro ( Ak lpa( Ak)) have 
been calculated for all k > j, and that next we need to cal­
culate Pr0( Aj lpa( Aj)). To simplify the discussion, let Aj 
have exactly two children, Ak and A�o with j < k < l; 
the analysis generalizes easily to more children (or one 
child). Since the BN is decomposable, its topology is a tree 
of cliques [Chyu, 1991, Pearl, 1988, Shachter et al., 1991], 
and Ak and A1 can either be in the same clique or in sepa­
rate cliques, as depicted in Figure 2. Note that decompos­
ability also ensures that Aj's neighbors, A1 U Ak U pa(Aj ) , 
constitute its Markov blanket. We can query each of the 
agent's BNs for the probabilities Pr;(Aj IA1UAk Upa(AJ)) 
using a standard BN inference algorithm. From these, we 
can compute the corresponding consensus probability as a 
LogOP only over Aj, as before: 
Pro(Aj IA1 U Ak U pa(Aj )) 
N 
<X IT [Pr;(Aj IA1 U Ak U pa(Aj ))]"'. 
i=l 
We now need only eliminate the conditioning on A1 and 
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Ak. By Bayes's rule, we have that 
Pro(AiiAt U Ak U pa(Aj)) 
Pro(Aj I At U Ak U pa(Aj )) 
Pro(At U AkiAi U pa(Aj)) . Pro(AiiPa(Aj)) 
Pro(At U AkiAi U pa(Aj)) Pro(AiiPa(Aj)) 
Pro(AtiAk U Aj U pa(Aj )) . Pro(Ak IAi U pa(Aj )) 
Pro(AtiAk U Aj U pa(Aj)) Pro(AkiAi Upa(Ai)) 
Pr0(Aj jpa(Aj )) 
Pro(Aj lpa(Aj )) · 
Because the BN is decomposable, and regardless of 
whether Ak and At are in the same or different cliques, 
Pro(AtiAk U Aj U pa(Aj)) = Pro(Atlpa(At)) and 
Pro(AkiAi U pa(Aj)) = Pro(Aklpa(Ak)), both of which 
have already been computed. Therefore we can calculate 
the CPT at Ai as follows: 
Pro(Ai jpa(Ai)) 
Pro(Aj jpa(Ai )) 
= Pro(Aj I At U Ak U pa(Aj )) 
Pro(Aj I At U Ak U pa(Aj )) 
Pro(Aklp-a(Ak)) 
Pro(Aklpa(Ak))' 
Pro(AtiP'a(At)) 
Pro(Adpa(At)) 
(13) 
where pa(Ak) and pa(At) contain Ai, and pa(Ak) and 
pa( At) contain Ai. Once we compute the likelihood ratio 
on the LHS of (13 ), the desired probabilities are uniquely 
determined, since Pr0(Ailpa(Aj)) + Pr0(Ajlpa(Aj)) = 
1. 
A consensus BN consistent with the LinOP would in gen­
eral be fully connected, and thus not an object of particular 
value. However, if all agents' beliefs are given as BNs, 
we can retain their separation and still compute LinOP 
queries more efficiently. We exploit the fact that the LinOP 
obeys the marginalization property, and thus that the LinOP 
of any compound, marginal event can be computed as a 
LinOP over only that event. For example, 
n 
i=l 
where the terms on the RHS are calculated using a standard 
algorithm for Bayesian inference. Any conditional proba­
bility can be computed as the division of two compound, 
marginal probabilities. 
Finally, we characterize the computational complexity of 
LinOP when all input models are BNs. Clearly, comput­
ing an arbitrary query Pr0(EIF) is NP-hard. Proposition 4 
establishes that, even when all topologies agree, and even 
when only computing the LinOP of a CPT entry, the prob­
lem remains intractable. 
Proposition 4 Let all input BNs have identical topologies. 
Then computing Pr0(Ai jpa(Aj )) consistent with LinOP is 
NP-hard. 
Proof. (sketch) Suppose that n = 2. Let Pr1 be an ar­
bitrary BN and let Pr2 have an identical topology, but en­
code a uniform distribution-that is, Pr2(w) = l/2m. We 
have shown that, if Pro(Amlpa(Am)) were computable 
in polynomial time, then Pr1 (Am) could be inferred in 
polynomial time. Computing the later query is NP-hard 
[Cooper, 1990], and so the former must be as well. D 
6 Conclusions 
Graphical representations of a single agent's subjective be­
lief form the core of many successful applications of un­
certain reasoning. We examine the problem of combining 
several graphical models, to form a consensus model. Two 
intuitively reasonable assumptions in this context, made a 
priori by other authors, are ( 1) if all agents agree on a sin­
gle topology, then that structure should be maintained, and 
(2) probability aggregation can be isolated within each con­
ditional probability table (CPT). We demonstrate that each 
of these properties leads to an impossibility theorem when 
combined with other reasonable, oft-invoked assumptions. 
We prove that the logarithmic opinion pool (LogOP) main­
tains all agreed-upon Markov independencies, and describe 
procedures for constructing consensus Markov networks 
and consensus Bayesian networks that are consistent with 
the LogOP. We provide an algorithm for computing the 
CPTs of a LogOP-consistent consensus BN that takes ad­
vantage of available structure. 
We consider the main contribution of this work to be an ex­
tension of known results on aggregating joint distributions 
to the case of combining graphical models. The results en­
tail serious pitfalls for a modeler wishing to take into ac­
count the divergent opinions of multiple sources. Coherent 
combination of multiple models requires careful interpre­
tation of the models to be combined, and deliberate consid­
eration of the desired properties of the result. 
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